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Abstract 
A number of studies have revealed that the effect of industrial policy on productivity 
growth is negative.  Is this because industrial policy fails to control the activities of 
firms, or because it can effectively control them?    This paper attempts to answer these 
questions, using firm-level data from the cotton spinning industry in Japan for the 
period 1956–64.    It has been determined that industrial policy cut two ways during this 
period.  Industrial policy effectively controlled the output of cotton spinning firms, 
which contributed to the establishment of a stable market structure during the period.  
On the flip side, such policy constrained the reallocation of resources from less 
productive large firms to more productive small firms.  Combined with the negative 
productivity growth in large firms during this period, industrial policy resulted in 
negative industry productivity growth. 
JEL classification: D21 (Firm Behavior), D4 (Market Structure and Pricing), L5 
(Regulation and Industrial Policy), N0 (Economic History), K2 (Regulation and 
Business Law) 
Keywords: Industrial Policy; Regulation; Reallocation; Productivity Growth; 
Endogeneity 
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Whether industrial policy contributes to productivity growth is an important 
question in the fields of industrial organization, law and economics, and development 
economics (see Noland and Pack 2003; Rodrick 2007, Chapter 4).  Among industrial 
policies applied in various periods and countries, one of the most controversial policies 
is the Japanese industrial policy during the postwar period.
1  This controversy arises 
because the "success" of some Japanese industrial policies has been used to justify 
"targeting" policies in other countries, including the United States.
2  Because of this, 
several studies have investigated the effects of Japanese industrial policy (see Kiyota 
and Okazaki 2005).    An important lesson from previous studies is that, while Japanese 
industrial policy may have contributed to the growth of labor productivity, it did not 
contribute to the growth of total factor productivity (TFP).  For example, Beason and 
Weinstein (1996) examined the effects of industrial policy on industry-level TFP growth 
in Japan.    They revealed that industrial policy did not have a significant positive effect 
on productivity growth.  Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) utilized firm-level data in Japan.  
They found that industrial policy had a positive effect on labor productivity, but not on 
                                                 
1  The Japanese government implemented an industrial policy to control international trade, 
investment, technology imports, and foreign exchange (Noland and Pack 2003, pp. 23–37). 
2  "In fact, it is the success of Japanese targeting that is often used as the justification for targeting in 
the United States" (Beason and Weinstein 1996, p. 286).    Note that whether or not Japanese 
industrial policy was a "success" is still controversial, because total factor productivity would have 
fallen more without industrial policy.    In this paper, the focus is on the mechanisms behind the 
negative relationships between industrial policy and industry productivity growth.    A thorough 
evaluation of industrial policy is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  1TFP. 
Even though these previous studies were insightful, there is not yet a clear 
answer to why industrial policy produced a negative effect on TFP.    This uncertainty is 
a result of two contrasting interpretations of the results.  The first is that industrial 
policy failed to control the activities of firms and, therefore, lowered industry 
productivity growth.  The second is that the government was able to control the 
activities of firms and, therefore, lowered industry productivity growth.  The former 
interpretation implies that the problem lies in implementation, rather than in policy 
design, whereas the latter explanation implies that the problem lies in the policy design 
itself.  Without clarifying these differences, it is difficult to assess accurately the 
effects of industrial policy. 
To answer this question, the ways in which industrial policy affects the activities 
of firms need to be examined.  However, most of the previous studies that have dealt 
with productivity have focused on the correlation between industrial policy measures 
and productivity growth, without focusing on specific changes in a firm's activities.  
Moreover, previous studies on the effect of industrial policy on productivity have paid 
little attention to the legal framework and historical background of the time period, 
which makes it difficult to identify which activities were truly controlled by industrial 
policy.  Indeed, adequate discussion on the effect of industrial policy on a firm's 
activities is missing from this literature strand.
3 
                                                 
3  On the other hand, a number of historical studies have provided a detailed examination of the 
institutional and historical background to industrial policy, many of them focusing on the cotton 
spinning industry (Korenaga 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005; Peck, Levin, and Goto 1987; Saxonhouse 
1979; Yamazawa 1978, 1981).    However, these studies are basically descriptive and their scope 
  2This paper examines the effect of industrial policy on industry productivity 
growth.    One of the major contributions of this paper is to provide a missing element in 
this discussion by presenting an explanation of how industrial policy affects a firm's 
activities, and why industrial policy lowers industry productivity growth.  This paper 
also attempts to address explicitly the possible endogeneity between industrial policy 
and firm characteristics, which has not yet been explored in the literature on industrial 
policy.    The focus is on the cotton spinning industry in Japan in the period 1956–64, an 
industry in which a key legal framework was implemented to control the output of 
cotton spinning firms during this time frame. 
This paper also contributes to the literature that examines the effects of policy 
change on productivity.   In the international trade literature, on one hand, a number of 
studies, such as Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Kimura and Kiyota (2006), have 
estimated productivity at the firm level, have found productivity differences across 
firms within the same industry (that is, firm heterogeneity), and attempted to link the 
differences to firm characteristics such as exporting activities.  Although many 
theoretical models that motivate these examinations have in mind some exogenous 
policy shocks such as trade liberalization that affects firms differently (for example, 
Melitz 2003), most of the empirical studies do not actually identify particular policy 
shocks.    In the industrial policy literature, on the other hand, a number of studies have 
examined the effects of particular industrial policies as noted.  However, only a few 
studies utilize firm-level data.    This paper covers the shortcomings of previous studies 
by utilizing firm-level data and identifying a particular policy change. 
                                                                                                                                               
does not extend to a discussion of the link between industrial policy and productivity growth. 
  3Focusing on the cotton spinning industry in Japan provides at least four 
advantages.  First, the data cover almost all firms in the industry, which provides the 
opportunity to examine the effects on both small firms and large firms.  Second, 
detailed information on physical inputs and outputs are available.  This study thus 
avoids some of the potential problems in using monetary variables as proxies for inputs 
or outputs.
4  Third, precise information on industrial policy is also available from the 
literature on economic history and from historical records.  Finally, the lessons drawn 
from industrial policy in Japan have implications for industrial policy in other countries, 
particularly developing countries (for example, Noland and Pack 2003). 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews industrial policy in the 
cotton spinning industry in Japan.  Section 3 explains the empirical model and data.  
Section 4 presents the estimation results.    The conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
2.  Industrial Policy and the Cotton Spinning Industry: A Historical Review of the 
Legal Framework 
Until trade liberalization in the 1960s, foreign exchange allocation was a basic 
tool for industrial policy in Japan.  The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Administration Law of 1949 prescribed that foreign exchange should be concentrated in 
the government and that the government should draw up a foreign exchange budget to 
allocate foreign exchange quotas.  The basic purpose of this system was to maintain a 
balance of payments by saving foreign exchange; however, it was utilized for industrial 
                                                 
4  For example, Klette and Griliches (1996) pointed out that the use of deflated firm-level sales as a 
proxy for firm-level output can be biased when used to estimate the coefficients of the production 
function. 
  4policy purposes by the government, specifically the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). 
For example, for industries that depended upon imported raw materials, MITI 
could virtually control the production of each firm through foreign exchange allocations, 
which, in turn, supported the administrative guidance by MITI.  In addition, foreign 
exchange for some raw material imports was allocated according to the export 
performance of each firm that used them (the export link system).  This system was a 
powerful tool for the promotion of exports. 
However, as the Japanese economy recovered from the damage caused by WWII, 
and increased its presence in the world economy, foreign countries, in particular the 
United States, increased pressure on the Japanese government to liberalize trade.  In 
1959, at the General Meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
Tokyo, the United States representative requested that the Japanese government remove 
import restrictions.  To cope with this pressure from abroad, the Japanese cabinet 
decided on an action plan for trade liberalization in 1960 and, in practice, trade 
liberalization proceeded rapidly in the early 1960s (Fukao 1989; Nakakita 1993). 
The cotton spinning industry, the focus of this paper, was deeply involved in this 
foreign exchange allocation system.  Its raw materials (inputs), raw cotton, as well as 
its products (outputs), cotton yarn, were classified as goods that could not be imported 
without foreign exchange allocation by MITI.  In other words, the cotton spinning 
industry was not only protected from international competition through foreign 
exchange allocations for cotton yarn, but domestic competition was also regulated by 
MITI through foreign exchange allocations for raw cotton (Japan Spinners' Association 
1962, pp. 226–270; Korenaga 2000).  In the early 1960s, as part of a general policy 
  5change, the cotton spinning industry experienced trade liberalization.  In April 1961, 
the import of raw cotton was liberalized and government intervention in the cotton 
spinning industry by means of foreign exchange allocations was discontinued. 
Meanwhile, production and equipment levels in the cotton spinning industry 
increased rapidly.  When World War II ended in 1945, the 10 largest firms dominated 
the cotton spinning industry, which came to be called "judai-bo."    After the war, many 
smaller firms entered the industry and were called "shin-bo" and "shinshin-bo."    These 
smaller firms, as well as "judai-bo", contributed to the expansion of the industry, in the 
areas of both production and equipment. 
Consequently, from the mid 1950s, the cotton spinning industry was faced with 
excess capacity.  To deal with this problem, an equipment registration system was 
introduced in 1956 through the Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry 
Equipment (Sen'i Kogyo Setsubi Rinji Sochi Ho).  This law required that all firms 
register their cotton spinning equipment with the government as equipment to be used in 
specific categories of products and that only the registered equipment should be used to 
manufacture those products. 
Every year, the government could approve new registrations if the capacity of 
registered equipment was likely to be insufficient to meet the forecasted, anticipated 
demand of the following year.  If the capacity of registered equipment was likely to 
exceed anticipated demand in the following year, the government could instruct the 
firms to cooperate by suspending the use of excess equipment.  In reality, no new 
registrations were approved, and hence the number of registered spindles did not 
increase after 1957 (Japan Spinners' Association, various half year issues). 
In April 1959, the government decided that there existed 1.28 million excess 
  6spindles and instructed the firms to suspend their use, in accordance with the Law on 
Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment.  The  suspension  rate  was  defined 
as a percentage of the registered spindles, and was 7.5% for the firms with registered 
spindles of 7,000 or less.  For firms with more than 7,000 registered spindles, the 
suspension rate was 7.5% for up to 7,000 spindles and 15% for any spindles over 7,000 
(Japan Spinners' Association 1962, p. 100).  This means that the operable spindles for 
each firm beginning in 1959 were reduced by at least 7.5%, depending on the number of 
the spindles they had registered.  The suspension rate was reduced in October 1961.  
The new suspension rate was 6% for the firms with registered spindles of 7,000 or less.   
For firms with more than 7,000 registered spindles, the new suspension rate was 6% for 
up to 7,000 spindles and 12% for any spindles over 7,000 (Japan Spinners' Association 
1961, pp. 43–44). 
The role of the equipment controls increased after trade liberalization because, 
in the past, the government could effectively regulate the production of each firm 
through foreign exchange allocations for raw cotton (Japan Spinners' Association 1962, 
pp. 100–101).    Hence, in 1959, the Japan Spinners' Association put forward a proposal 
requesting that a new "industrial order" be prepared to replace the foreign exchange 
allocation system, which had been "the central pillar for the regulation of the cotton 
industry" (Japan Spinners' Association 1962, pp. 84–85). 
This proposal was reflected in the July 1960 amendments to the Law on 
Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment.  Two major reforms were 
implemented in this revision.  First, the government was given the authority to order 
firms to suspend the use of their equipment to allow for short-term adjustments in 
production, in addition to making long-term adjustments.  Second, fines were 
  7implemented to deal with firms that did not comply with these new government 
directives (Japan Spinners' Association 1962, pp. 88–94). 
In October 1964, the amended law was replaced by the New Law on Temporary 
Measures for Textile Industry Equipment.  This new law was proposed as a step 
toward deregulation of the cotton spinning industry.  First, the clause on short-term 
production adjustments was deleted.  Short-term production adjustments were left to 
the "depression cartel" provisions contained in the Anti-monopoly Law, which required 
Fair Trade Committee approval.  Second, a new "scrap and build" clause was added.  
This allowed firms that disposed of suspended equipment to register new equipment up 
to half the value of the disposed.  This clause targeted the promotion of rapid 
modernization of equipment to enhance the international competitiveness of the industry.   
The cotton spinning industry was expected to have become internationally competitive 
and fully deregulated by the time the new law expired four years later in 1968 (Japan 
Spinners' Association 1979, pp. 57–64).    As it was, after a two-year extension, the new 
law was abolished in June 1970 (ibid p. 106 and p. 149).
5 
One may be concerned that a focus on this industrial policy is an examination of 
an unusual case.    However, it is indeed in line with the literature.    For example, from 
the Schumpeterian view, industrial policy could provide greater incentives to invest in 
                                                 
5  Government intervention related to textile equipment continued until the early 1980s and was for 
the purpose of structural improvement of the industry.    In August 1967, the Law on Temporary 
Measures for Structural Improvement of Specific Textile Industries was enacted.    The main 
objectives of this law were: 1) to dispose of excess equipment, 2) to increase firm scale, and 3) to 
update equipment.    This law was followed by the Law on Temporary Measures for Structural 
Improvement of Textile Industries in 1974.    For more details, see Korenaga (2002). 
  8new technology and processes, such as subsidizing technology development.  This in 
turn stimulates competition among firms and could lead to rapid growth in productivity 
(see Aghion, Dewartripont, and Rey 1997).    On the flip side, if industrial policy forces 
firms to reduce capital stocks by taking spindles equipment out of operation, industrial 
policy will discourage firms to invest in new technologies and thus can cause a negative 
effect on productivity.
6    In the following sections, this issue is explored in more detail. 
 
3.  Empirical Model and Data 
3.1.  Estimation of the Production Function and Productivity 
The econometric analysis on the dynamic framework is based upon firm profit-
maximizing behavior, developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and extended by Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) (LP).  Specifically, we estimate the following Cobb–Douglas 
production function: 
, 0 nt nt m nt e nt l nt k nt m e l k y ε β β β β β + + + + + =                                ( 1 )  
where  ,  ,  ,  , and   are the natural logs of output, capital stock, 
employment, energy, and materials of firm n  in year  , respectively; and 
nt y nt k nt l nt e nt m
t nt ε  is 
unobserved by researchers and consists of two components, with one being productivity 
level  nt ω   and the other being an error term  nt η .  TFP is obtained from: 
) nt exp( nt TFP ω = . 
                                                 
6  This type of policy came to be widely applied in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, when many 
industries were faced with overcapacity following the decline of economic growth and the sharp rise 
in oil prices (Bureau of Industrial Policy, Ministry of International Trade and Industry ed. 1983, 
1988). 
  9A firm maximizes the expected value of its current and future profits, and can 
easily adjust labor, energy, and material inputs.  However, capital is a quasi-fixed 
input.
7    Capital in use in year    is assumed to be known at the beginning of the year, 
and thus capital is another state variable.  Note that productivity may be observed by 
the firm, although it is unobserved by the researchers.   If the firm's private knowledge 
of its productivity affects its choice of inputs, there exists a correlation between the 
choice of inputs and productivity.  As pointed out in Marschak and Andrews (1944), 
such a correlation causes a simultaneity problem.  This simultaneity violates the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) conditions for unbiased and consistent estimation. 
t
LP suggest a method for overcoming the simultaneity problem in production 
function estimation by using a material input as a proxy for the unobserved productivity 
component.  Let the demand function for materials be  ) , ( nt nt nt nt k m m ω = , and the 
inverse of the optimal function with respect to  nt ω  be  ) , ( nt nt nt nt k m ω ω = .  This 
implies that: 
, ) , ( nt nt nt nt nt e nt l nt k m e l y η φ β β + + + =                                      ( 2 )  
where 
) , ( ) , ( 0 t n nt nt nt m nt k t n t n nt k m m k k m ω β β β φ + + + = .                             ( 3 )  
Assuming that  ) , ( nt nt nt k m φ  can be approximated by a third-order polynomial and 
adding some technical assumptions, the consistent estimators of the production function 
are obtained.  We employ the LP estimation to overcome the simultaneity problem to 
estimate the production function. 
                                                 
7  Note that this assumption is consistent with the historical review in Section 2 because the Japanese 
government partly controlled some of the equipment. 
  10 
3.2.  Data 
The main source of data is Statistics on the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry 
(Menshi Boseki Jijo Sankosho), published biannually by the Japan Spinners' Association 
(various half year issues).
8  The strength of these statistics is their wide sample 
coverage and reliability, as well as the comprehensiveness of the information they 
provide.    These statistics cover the majority of cotton spinning firms in Japan.    At the 
same time, they include quantitative information such as output, labor input, material 
input, energy usage, and capital stock figures.  However, information on sales and 
investment is not available. 
From these statistics, a longitudinal (panel) data set was constructed for the 
years 1956 to 1964.  This covers the entire period of when the Law on Temporary 
Measures for Textile Industry Equipment was enforced; hence, consistent data on 
equipment available exists from Statistics on the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry.  
Firms for which output or input information is not available, or is not positive, have 
been excluded.  Firms that existed for only one year have also been excluded.  The 
total number of sample firms exceeded 120 for every year.  The numbers of workers 
covered in the dataset are 92,430 in 1956, and 76,405 in 1964, which are 71% and 68%, 
respectively, of all the regular workers in the cotton spinning industry in Japan.
9 
Output is defined as the weighted average of 12 output commodities.
10  Weight 
                                                 
8  The Japan Spinners' Association changed its name from the All Japan Cotton Spinners' Association 
in 1964.   
9  The total number of regular workers was 129,738 in 1956 and 111,549 in 1964 (MITI 1958, 1966). 
10  The 12 commodities are: 1) cotton yarn, 2) blended spinning cotton yarn, 3) spun rayon yarn, 4) 
  11is defined as the sales share of each commodity.  As mentioned above, sales data are 
not available from Statistics on the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry.    Unit price data 
have been obtained from the Bank of Japan (1956–1964) to calculate sales.
11  Inputs 
are defined as labor, capital stock, material input, and energy usage.  Labor is defined 
as the sum of production workers and white collar workers.  Because data on white 
collar workers are not available for the periods before 1958, the number of white collar 
workers was estimated using the proportion of white collar workers to the total number 
of workers in 1959.  Capital stock is defined as the number of operating spindles.
12  
Material input is defined as the weighted average of the eight materials.
13  Weight is 
                                                                                                                                               
waste cotton yarn, 5) blended waste cotton yarn, 6) tokubo, 7) viscose staple yarn, 8) mixed spun 
rayon yarn, 9) blended synthetic yarn, 10) synthetic yarn, 11) cotton waste, and 12) rayon staple 
waste. 
11  Note that the unit price depends on a "count," which is a unit that indicates the thickness of yarn.   
The higher the count, the thinner the yarn.    Thinner yarn is regarded as being of higher quality and, 
therefore, a higher count means a higher unit price.    Although the unit price is available only for 
20-count yarn in Statistics on the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry, the conversion rate (the 
relationship between unit price and count) is available for cotton yarn and spun rayon yarn (Fujino, 
Fujino, and Ono 1979).    The unit prices for cotton yarn and spun rayon yarn have been adjusted, 
based on this conversion rate.    This means that the unit price differs across different firms.    For the 
conversion rate, see Table A1. 
12  The number of operating spindles refers to the average number of spindles actually operated in a 
certain year.    Its upper limit was the number of operable spindles: the registered spindles minus 
spindles that were not suspended or out of order.    Note that whereas no additional registration was 
approved after 1957, the number of operating spindles could change within the limit. 
13  The eight inputs are: 1) cotton, 2) rayon staple, 3) viscose staple, 4) waste cotton yarn, 5) 
  12defined as the share of material costs.    Energy usage is defined as the weighted average 
of the three energy inputs.
14  The cost of energy is used for the weight.  Unit price 
data for the material inputs have been obtained from the Bank of Japan (1956–1964), as 
have unit price data for energy usage (Bank of Japan 1964).
15 
Figure 1 presents the output share of the 10 largest firms, namely "judai-bo," for 
1956–1979.  Except in 1964–65, when the New Law on Temporary Measures for 
Textile Industry Equipment was enacted, the share of "judai-bo" remained stable from 
the late 1960s.  The cotton spinning industry maintained a stable market structure for 
two decades in the sense that the share of these large firms remained almost constant 
throughout the period.  Note that the coverage of Statistics on the Japanese Cotton 
Spinning Industry changed when the New Law on Temporary Measures for Textile 
Industry Equipment was enacted in 1965.
16  To exclude this effect, the period prior to 
1965 was focused upon. 
                                                                                                                                               
polyester, 6) vinyl, 7) nylon, and 8) acrylic. 
14  The three energy inputs are: 1) coal, 2) electricity, and 3) heavy oil. 
15  The unit price is available only at the industry level.    For a more detailed description of the 
definition and the source of unit price data, see Table A1. 
16 Until  1964,  Statistics on the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry surveyed the equipment classified 
into cotton spinning by the Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment of 1956, 
and it also surveyed the outputs and inputs of that equipment.    As the new law was enacted in 
October 1964 and the classification of equipment was changed, the Statistics on the Japanese Cotton 
Spinning Industry expanded the coverage of the survey to include equipment for other new outputs 
such as spun rayon yarn in 1965, when the coverage of the survey on outputs and inputs was 
expanded as well.    That is why the output share of the large firms declined in 1965 (Figure 1).    For 
more details, see the Japan Spinners' Association (1960, page I). 
  13  
=== Figure 1 === 
  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for 1956–1964.    To measure the effects 
of the New Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment (that is, 
industrial policy), the ratio of suspended spindles was used, which is defined as the ratio 
of the number of suspended spindles to the total registered spindles.
17  Because the 
suspended spindles ratio was different across different firms, the ratio allows the capture 
of the industrial policy effect at the firm level. 
 
=== Table 1 === 
 
There are four major findings in this table.  First, labor productivity grew 
steadily from 1956 to 1964.  Labor productivity increased during the industrial policy 
period, increasing from 5.04 in 1959 to 5.86 in 1964.  Second, the cotton spinning 
firms started using synthetic yarn as an intermediate input from 1959.  The ratio of 
                                                 
17  The data on the suspended spindles for the end of 1964 are not available in the second half of the 
year issue of Menshi Boseki Jijo Sankosho for 1964, reflecting the change in the legal framework in 
October 1964.    Hence, for 1964, we use the number of the suspended spindles at the end of June 
1964, available in the first half of the year issue of Boseki Jijo Sankosho for 1964.    The ratio of 
suspended spindles should be between 0.075 and 0.15 for 1959–1960 and between 0.06 and 0.12 for 
1961–1964.  However,  in  some  firm-years, the ratios were outside these ranges.    Because it is 
impossible to identify whether firms mistakenly reported these figures or broke the law, the analysis 
was conducted assuming that these figures were reported correctly. 
  14synthetic yarn to material inputs increased from 0% in 1958 to 7% in  1968.  This  result 
may support the view that the introduction of synthetic yarn improved the productivity 
of the cotton spinning firms.
18  Third, the industrial policy controlled the amount of 
equipment used by firms after 1959.  On average, the ratio of suspended spindles is 
6.8–8.6% after the suspension of spindles started in 1959.  Finally, the correlation 
between the suspended spindles ratio and firm size (measured by the capital stock) 
ranges between 0.40 and 0.48.  This implies that the suspended spindles ratio is not 
just a proxy for firm size but that it may be related to firm size. 
These results seem to suggest that, through the regulation on equipment, 
industrial policy made a significant contribution to raising labor productivity while also 
controlling firm output to maintain a stable market structure.  Indeed, the growth in 
labor productivity and the maintenance of a stable market structure are surprising, 
considering the fact that the cotton spinning industry was faced with a substantial 
change in the technological environment.  An example of these changes is the 
widespread adoption of synthetic fiber as an intermediate input, given that the Japanese 
economy experienced rapid growth during the 1960s and a severe recession in the early 
1970s.  Note, however, that labor productivity may not be a good indicator of 
productivity, because labor productivity increases not through an increase in the 
efficiency of workers, but through an increase in other types of inputs, such as capital or 
                                                 
18  For example, Nagahama (1965, pp. 5–6) stated that the synthetic yarn enabled the cotton spinning 
firms to control the quality of staple more easily, which improved firm productivity.    However, 
none of the previous studies has statistically examined the relationship between the use of the 
synthetic yarn and firm productivity.    Section 4.2 addresses this issue in more detail. 
  15energy.    To control the effects of the other factors, the next section estimates TFP.
19 
 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Firm-Level Productivity 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the input coefficients from the production 
function.  The production function was estimated using all cotton spinning firms 
included in the source data for 1956–64 (unbalanced panel), based on OLS and LP 
estimation.
20  The estimates of the coefficients derived from LP estimation are 
significantly different from those derived from OLS.    While the OLS results reject the 
null hypothesis that the production function has constant returns to scale, the LP 
estimation results do not reject the null hypothesis.  This implies that the coefficients 
are biased downward in OLS estimation and, therefore, LP estimation successfully 
eliminates the simultaneity bias.  These results also suggest that the Japanese 
government does not necessarily target increasing returns to scale in the sector. 
  
=== Table 2 === 
  
Table 3 presents the (unweighted) annual average level of growth in labor 
productivity and TFP between 1956 and 1964.  TFP is obtained from LP estimation.  
Table 3 also reports levels and growth rates for both large and small firms.
21  I n  
                                                 
19  As noted, investment data are not available from this data source.    The LP estimation method is 
applied to estimate TFP. 
20  Table A2 presents entry and exit patterns. 
21  To simplify the discussion, large firms are known as "judai-bo", and "shin-bo" and "shinshin-bo" 
  16Section 2, the year identified was when the industrial policy was enacted (that is, 1959).   
Productivity growth was compared before and during the times the industrial policy was 
enacted, to assess the productivity implications of industrial policy. 
  
=== Table 3 === 
  
Three findings stand out from this table.    First, labor productivity grew rapidly, 
even after the industrial policy was enacted.  The annual average growth rate was 
5.59% for 1956–59 and 2.76% for 1959–64.  Second, by contrast, TFP did not show 
significant growth.    The annual average rate of TFP growth was 0.65% and 0.27% for 
the years 1956–59 and 1959–64, respectively.  As noted in the introduction, these 
results are consistent with the findings of previous studies, such as Beason and 
Weinstein (1996) and Kiyota and Okazaki (2005). 
Finally, both labor productivity and TFP growth rates for large firms were 
consistently lower than those for small firms.  For example, the TFP growth rate for 
small firms was 0.70% for 1956–59, whereas the rate for large firms was –0.01%.  
Moreover, the TFP growth rate for large firms for 1959–64 was –0.72%.  This  result  is 
surprising when combined with the knowledge that large firms maintained around a 
48% market share between 1957 and 1964 (Figure 1 and Table 1), despite their 
productivity decreasing during this period.  In addition, it is also interesting to note 
that the difference in TFP growth between large and small firms is not necessarily 
attributable to the catch-up process of small firms.  This is because on average, the 
                                                                                                                                               
are small firms. 
  17TFP level of small firms is greater than that of large firms throughout this period. 
Note that Table 3 simply presents the difference in productivity growth before 
and during industrial policy.  Hence, it is not clear whether industrial policy has 
created significant negative effects on the efficiency of the cotton spinning firms.    The 
results clearly confirm that the output share of large firms was not supported by either 
efficiency or by an unobservable effort that would have been captured by TFP.  This 
result implies that industrial policy effectively controlled a firm's activities.  The next 
section examines in more detail the implications of these findings for industry 
productivity growth. 
 
4.2.  Productivity and Industrial Policy 
To examine the effects of industrial policy on productivity, we employ the 
methodology that is used to examine the effects of trade liberalization on productivity. 
Similar to Pavcnik (2002), and Amiti and Konings (2007), the possible links between 
industrial policy and firm-level productivity are specified as follows: 
, )   ( )     ( 2 1 0 nt nt nt t i nt yarn synthetic ratio spindles suspended υ γ γ χ χ γ ω + + + + + =     ( 4 )  
where  i χ  denotes firm-specific fixed effects that capture unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity,  t χ   denotes year-fixed effects that control for industry-level shocks over 
time (for example, demand shocks),   denotes the ratio of 
suspended spindles that captures the effects of industrial policy, and 
ratio spindles suspended    
nt υ  denotes the 
error term.    As a control variable, a synthetic yarn-material input ratio   
was included to control for the effects of the introduction of synthetic fiber.  The 
suspended spindles ratio and the synthetic yarn ratios are the same as those used in 
yarn synthetic 
  18Table 1. 
Table 4 presents the regression results.  Columns (1) and (2) indicate the 
results of the fixed-effects and random-effects models, respectively.  The synthetic 
yarn–material ratio shows significantly positive coefficients, which is consistent with 
the anecdotal evidence discussed in Section 3.2.  On the other hand, the suspended 
spindles ratio does not have a significant sign.  Note however, that the suspended 
spindles ratio could be endogenous as Section 2 found that the suspension rate was 
different according to the number of registered spindles.  Another regression was run 
in order to address the possible endogeneity of industrial policy.  The ratio of 
suspended spindles is treated as an endogenous variable, while capital stock and other 
exogenous variables are instrumental variables (IV).
22 
 
=== Table 4 === 
 
Column (3) presents the two-step efficient GMM estimator.  Firm-specific 
fixed effects are included to control for the unobservable heterogeneity of firms.
23  T h e  
endogenous (GMM distance) test statistic rejects the null that the suspended spindles 
ratio can be treated as exogenous at the 95% level.    In the first stage regression results, 
the Kleibergen–Paap underidentification Lagrange multiplier (LM) test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the equation is underidentified at the 99% level.  The weak 
identification Wald F statistic exceeds 10, "the rule of thumb" of Staiger and Stock 
                                                 
22  Other exogenous variables are the synthetic yarn-material ratio and year dummies. 
23  The time-invariant "judai-bo" (that is, large firms) specific effects are wiped out by the firm-
specific fixed effects. 
  19(1997).  The null hypothesis that the instrument is weak is rejected at the significant 
critical value. 
These results suggest that the instruments have some validity.    The regression 
results indicate that, once the endogeneity of industrial policy is controlled for, the 
coefficient of the suspended spindles ratio turns out to be significantly negative.  The 
result implies that industrial policy produces negative effects on TFP.    The coefficients 
of the OLS fixed- and random-effects models are biased because of the endogeneity.
24 
 
4.3.  Industry Productivity Growth 
Figure 1 and Table 1 indicate that industrial policy effectively controlled the 
output of cotton spinning firms.  Table 3 shows that TFP growth in large firms was 
negative during this period, and Table 4 indicates that industrial policy produced 
significant negative effects on the productivity of firms.  Note that these figures are 
derived from an (unweighted) arithmetic average of firm-level productivity.  We 
extend the analysis to assess the implications for overall industry productivity growth.   
As in Olley and Pakes (1996), the aggregate productivity level is defined as the 
weighted average of firm-level productivity, with the share of industry output defined as 
                                                 
24  One may be concerned that the results are influenced by the firms whose suspended spindles 
ratios are outside the ranges (see footnote 23).    An alternative ratio was constructed that takes the 
upper limit value (0.15 for 1959–1960 and 0.12 for 1961–1964) if the ratio exceeds the upper limit 
value and takes the lower limit value (0.075 for 1959–1960 and 0.06 for 1961–1964) if the ratio 
becomes smaller than the lower limit.    A regression was then run, replacing the suspended spindles 
ratio with this alternative ratio.    It was found that the regression results were qualitatively similar in 
each case. 
  20the weight: 
, ∑ ≡
n nt nt t s ω ω                                                        ( 5 )  
where   is the share of firm  's output in the cotton spinning industry in year  .  
Note that aggregate productivity growth is driven not only by continuing firms but also 
by entering/exiting firms.  To incorporate the effect of entry/exit into the aggregate 
productivity growth, following Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), the aggregate 
productivity growth was decomposed using a modified version of Baily, Hulten, and 
Campbell (1992). 
nt s n t
Specifically, the aggregate productivity growth  t ω Δ  is decomposed into five 
components:
25 1) "within effect," which captures the contribution of each firm's own 
productivity growth; 2) "between effect" or "reallocation effect," which captures the 
changes in output shares; 3) "covariance effect," which captures the correlation between 
the changes in the shares and the productivity growth; 4) "entry effect," which captures 
the effects of entry, and 5) "exit effect," which captures the effects of exit.    To examine 
the difference in the productivity growth between large and small firms, the within and 
between effects were further decomposed for large and small firms, respectively.
26 
Table 5 presents the decomposition of the industry productivity growth.  The 
major findings are threefold.  First, the industry productivity growth was positive 
between 1956 and 1959, but turned negative between 1959 and 1964.   In addition, the 
aggregate industry growth moved in tandem with the within effect.  This finding 
suggests that the industry productivity growth can be attributed to each firm's own 
                                                 
25  See the Appendix for an explanation of how the decomposition is computed. 
26  A similar decomposition exercise can be found in Baily, Halten, and Campbell (1992). 
  21productivity growth.  Second, the large firms demonstrated a lower within effect than 
the small firms.    The within effects of the large firms were –0.01% for 1956–59 and –
0.44% for 1959–64.  The within effects of the small firms were 0.35% and 0.04% for 
1956–59 and 1959–64, respectively. 
  
=== Table 5 === 
  
Third, the between effect did not contribute to industry productivity growth, 
especially after 1959.  This result implies that the reallocation of resources from the 
less productive large firms to the more productive small firms was ineffective during 
this period.  Industrial policy effectively controlled the output of the firms.   
Simultaneously, however, this control also restricted the reallocation of resources across 
these same firms.  Combined with the negative TFP growth of the large firms, 
industrial policy resulted in overall negative industry productivity growth. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper examined the effect of industrial policy on industry productivity 
growth.  A detailed historical review of the industrial policies within the cotton 
spinning industry was first provided, in which the government introduced a major legal 
framework: the suspension of equipment after 1959.  This measure was designed to 
indirectly control the output of cotton spinning firms. 
Using firm-level data from the cotton spinning industry for 1956–64, estimations 
were then made on firm productivity and the industry as a whole, both before and 
during the industrial regulation period.    The major findings are summarized as follows.   
  22First, industrial policy effectively controlled the output of cotton spinning firms.  The 
output share of the 10 largest firms, which are called "judai-bo," remained stable from 
the late 1950s, after the Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment 
was enacted.  The market share of these large firms remained almost constant 
throughout this period. 
Second, cotton spinning firms experienced low total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth from 1956 to 1964.    The (unweighted) annual average growth rate was 0.27%.   
The TFP growth rate for large firms was consistently lower than the rate for small firms.   
The annual average TFP growth rate for large firms for 1959–64 was –0.72%, while the 
rate for small firms was 0.35%.  Therefore, the aggregate (weighted) industry 
productivity growth turned negative between 1959 and 1964.  Third, industrial policy 
had negative effects on firm productivity.  Besides, as a consequence of industrial 
policy, the reallocation effect did not work during this period.  Combined with the 
negative TFP growth rates of the large firms, industrial policy resulted in overall 
negative productivity growth in the cotton spinning industry. 
What would the TFP record have been without the policy intervention?  
Although our estimates cannot precisely answer this question, it is useful to discuss the 
counterfactual evidence.  As was indicated in Figure 1, industrial policy made a 
significant contribution to the maintenance of a stable market structure for two decades 
in the sense that the output share of the 10 largest firms remained almost constant 
throughout the period.    Based on the fact that the productivity level of these firms was 
lower than that of other small firms (Table 3), the output share of the 10 largest firms 
would have declined without industrial policy.  On the flip side, as was observed in 
several studies such as Olley and Pakes (1996), deregulation would cause a reallocation 
  23of capital toward more productive firms.  This implies that the output share of firms 
with higher productivity would increase.  The growth of overall industry productivity 
could mark a positive in the cotton spinning industry. 
One important policy implication that can be drawn from this analysis is that 
industrial policy often cuts two ways.    Industrial policy may be effective in controlling 
a firm's activities, such as output levels.  This control, however, implies that the 
industrial policy also constrains the reallocation of resources across the firms.  This 
type of policy will be effective when large firms achieve high rates of productivity 
growth.  Otherwise, the policy will fail.  Policymakers should recognize that 
industrial policy can be a double-edged sword. 
Future research should include a more thorough investigation of the validity of 
Levinsohn–Petrin (LP) estimation in analyzing the effects of policies, as an important 
extension.  LP estimation assumes perfectly competitive input markets.  However, 
various policies such as industrial policy and trade policy could distort the input markets 
and generate some imperfectly competitive environments.  This may cause biases in 
the LP estimator.  It is also important to control for the quality of the inputs, such as 
the difference between high- and low-quality capital to estimate firm productivity more 
precisely..  Further investigation on the endogeneity of industrial policy is another 
important extension.    To conduct such an analysis, it is imperative that the quality and 
coverage of the firm-level data and policy variables be improved and expanded. 
 
Appendix.    Decomposition of Industry TFP Growth 
To decompose the industry productivity growth  t ω Δ , we follow the method 
used by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) as follows: 
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where  { } { } ) 0 (
2 2 > Δ Δ = ∑ ∑ ∈ ∈ C n nt C n nt s ω ν ;  ω ρ Δ Δs   is the correlation between increases 
in the firm's output share and its productivity growth; and  ,  , and  C N X  represent 
the set of continuing firms, entering firms, and exiting firms, respectively. 
The first term indicates each firm's own productivity growth, weighted by the 
industry share of each firm in year  1 − t .    This is sometimes called the "within" effect.   
The second term represents the changes in the shares, weighted by the deviation of the 
productivity level from the industry average level in year  1 − t .  The second term 
captures the changes in the shares, which is sometimes called the "between" effect, or 
alternatively, the "reallocation" effect.    The third term captures the correlation between 
the changes in the shares and the productivity growth, which is called the "covariance" 
effect.  The fourth and last terms represent the effects of entry and exit, respectively.  
We use equation (A1) to decompose the industry productivity growth. 
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of the top 10
largest firms
(judai-bo)





1956 0.53 4.50 0.08 0.55 0.87 62.80 0.00 0 n.a.
1957 0.49 4.79 0.08 0.54 0.87 66.66 0.00 0 n.a.
1958 0.48 4.65 0.08 0.51 0.88 64.10 0.00 0 n.a.
1959 0.49 5.04 0.09 0.52 0.89 64.05 0.01 0.083 0.44
1960 0.49 5.30 0.09 0.51 0.90 65.66 0.02 0.086 0.48
1961 0.48 5.74 0.09 0.51 0.89 68.64 0.01 0.075 0.40
1962 0.47 5.52 0.10 0.49 0.90 63.71 0.02 0.070 0.44
1963 0.47 5.62 0.09 0.46 0.90 66.24 0.04 0.068 0.48
1964 0.47 5.86 0.09 0.46 0.92 71.03 0.07 0.069 0.48
Note: n.a. stands for not available.
Source: See main text.Table 2.  Estimation Results of Production Function
OLS LP estimation
Dependent variable: gross output Dependent variable: gross output
Independent variables Coefficient Standard error Significance level Coefficient Standard error Significance level p g g
Capital stock -0.003 0.009 0.754 0.085 0.167 0.612
Labor 0.033 0.011 0.003 0.022 0.029 0.452
Energy 0.063 0.016 0.000 0.071 0.037 0.055
Material inputs 0.893 0.012 0.000 0.815 0.178 0.000
Test of constant returns to scale
F-test: F-statistic = 22.5 (p-value = 0.000) Wald test: Chi-squared = 0.03 (p-value = 0.859)
Number of observations 1181 1181
Note: All standard errors are bootstrapped using 1,000 replications.
Source: See main text.Table 3.  Productivity Level and Growth
(Annual average)
Level Labor productivity TFP
All firms All firms
Large firms Small firms Large firms Small firms
1956-59 48 3 48 9 48 2 07 5 07 3 07 5 1956-59 4.83 4.89 4.82 0.75 0.73 0.75
1959-64 5.61 5.21 5.64 0.77 0.72 0.78
Growth Labor productivity TFP
(%) All firms All firms
Large firms Small firms Large firms Small firms
1956-59 5.59 -0.85 6.14 0.65 -0.01 0.70
1959-64 2.76 0.68 2.93 0.27 -0.72 0.35
Source: See main text.
Notes: Unweighted arithmetic annual average is reported. Large firms are the top 10 largest firms
(judai-bo) while small firms are other firms.Table 4.  Effects of Industrial Policy on Productivity
IV





Observations 1181 1181 Observations 1180
di Y Y di Y
OLS
Suspended spindles ratio
Synthetic yarn-material ratio Synthetic yarn-material ratio
Suspended spindles ratio
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes
Firm-specific effects Fixed Random Endogeneity (GMM distance) test 4.31**
R-squared Underidentification test
   overall 0.017 0.031    Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 31.20***
   within 0.041 0.038 Weak identification test
   between 0.041 0.126    Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 64.01
Hasuman test statistic
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant levels at 1, 5, and
10 percent, respectively. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. For IV estimation,
suspension rate is treated as endogenous variable while capital stock and other exogenous variables are as
instruments. Two-step GMM estimation is used for the second stage. In IV estimation, one observation is not
used because of the singleton group.
11.79Table 5.  Decomposition of Industry TFP Growth
[1] = [2] + [5]
+ [8] + [11]
[2] = [3]
+ [4]
[3] [4] [5] = [6]
+ [7]











1956-59 0.44 0.35 -0.01 0.35 -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.17
1959-64 -0.06 -0.40 -0.44 0.04 -0.26 -0.23 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.60
Source: See main text.













Entry ExitTable A1.  Price Data: Definition and Source




Fujino, Fujino and Ono (1979)
p Y1' Cotton yarn Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)




Fujino, Fujino and Ono (1979)
p Y3' Supun rayon yarn Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p Y4 Waste cotton yarn P Y1/P M1×P M6
p Y5 Blended waste cotton yarn (P Y4+P Y3)/2
p Y6 Tokubo P Y3
p Y7 Viscose staple yarn P Y3
p Y8 Mixed supun rayon yarn (P Y1+P Y3)/2
p Y9 Blended synthetic yarn (P Y1+P Y10)/2
p W +p W +p W Wih tW it h h f til
Cotton yarn, adjusted by
average count
Supun rayon yarn, adjusted by
average count
p Y10 Synthetic yarn
p Y10AW A+p Y10BW B+p Y10CW
C+p Y10CW D
Weight W j is the share of material
cost.
p Y10A Polyester Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p Y10B Vinylon Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p Y10V Nylon Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p Y10D Acrylic Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p Y11 Cotton weesp p M5
p Y12 Rayon staple weesp P Y3/P M1×P Y4
Material inputs
p M1 Cotton Available from the source
All Japan Cotton Spinners'
Association (various years)
p M2 Rayon staple Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p M3 Viscose staple P Y3
p M4 Waste cotton yarn Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p M5 Polyester Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p M6 Vinylon Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p M7 Nylon Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
p M8 Acrylic Available from the source Bank of Japan (1956-1964)
Energy use
p E1 Coal Available from the source Bank of Japan (1964)
p E2 Electricity Available from the source Bank of Japan (1964)
p E3 Heavy oil Available from the source Bank of Japan (1964)Table A2.  Number of Entry, Incumbent, and Exit
Number of firms
Total Entry Incumbent Exit
1956-57 132 11 121 0 1956-57 132 11 121 0
1957-58 135 3 132 0
1958-59 139 4 131 5
1959-60 134 0 132 2
1960-61 133 1 130 2
1961-62 132 1 128 3
1962-63 130 1 124 5
1963-64 125 0 121 4
Source: See main text.